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Background: Medicaid, States,
and Long-Term Care
M
edicaid plays a particularly important role in financing
long-term care for the elderly. It pays for approximately
one half of all long-term care costs in the U.S., and fi-
nances care for about two-thirds of all nursing home residents.1
About 35 percent of Medicaid spending in 2004 was for long-term
care. The average Medicaid payment per elderly beneficiary was
approximately five times as large as the average payment per
nondisabled adult or child.2
Yet despite the fact that Medicaid is one program, states show
tremendous variation in their coverage and spending. In Connect-
icut, for example, 86 out of 1,000 elderly people have Medicaid-
financed nursing home care, while only 48 out of 1,000 elderly
New Jersey residents receive such care.3 By way of further exam-
ple, Washington spends 65 percent more on nursing home care
per elderly person than does Oregon.4
Some of these differences in spending and coverage can be at-
tributed to differences in state policies and administrative pro-
cesses. Although states must cover nursing facility services for
individuals over age 21 and home health care services for
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A measure of Medicaid program
generosity, applied in this paper,
explains more variation in states’
long-term care spending than
individual policy measures analyzed
in previous research. This
“Long-Term Care Policy Generosity
Index” combines measures of client
eligibility, nursing home bed
capacity, waiver scale, and nursing
home reimbursement rates.
The index ranks New York’s
long-term care policies as more
generous than any other state, with
Connecticut, Minnesota,
Massachusetts, and Louisiana
following.
Variations in this measure may
have important implications for
understanding the differences in
states’ use of home- and
community-based waiver programs.
States such as Wisconsin and
Minnesota have both large waiver
programs and generous policies
overall, while others such as
Washington, Oregon, and Kansas
have large waiver programs but
less generous policies overall.
Future investigations of the effects
of state long-term care policy on
spending should include both more
qualitative examinations of
individual states or groups of
states, and consolidated or
interactive measures that combine
policy variables and thus capture
interactions among them.
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individuals entitled to nursing facility care, they also have many
options. Optional institutional services include Intermediate Care
Facilities for the Mentally Retarded and inpatient nursing facility
services for individuals age 65 and over in an institution for men-
tal diseases. Optional home and community-based long-term care
services (HCBS) include home health, case management, respira-
tory care, personal care, private duty nursing, hospice care, Pro-
grams of All Inclusive Care for Elderly (PACE), and home and
community- based waivers.
Areas of State Flexibility
Flexibility in Medicaid program structures and rules has per-
mitted states to produce widely varied long-term care systems.
For example, in terms of covered populations, some states cover dis-
abled, Medicaid eligible, working adults, while other states do
not. For those states that do cover this population, the point at
which a person’s income allows them to be eligible differs from
state to state. States also differ in the populations that are eligible
for services under Medicaid waivers. For instance, all states have
waivers for persons with developmental disabilities and mental
retardation, but not all states have waivers to provide services for
persons with AIDS or traumatic brain injuries.
States also determine the amount, duration, and scope of ser-
vices, and the processes for obtaining eligibility or receiving ser-
vices. A comparison of state flexibility in covered services shows
great variety. Thirty-one of 50 states provide personal care ser-
vices. Similarly, 23 states cover private duty nursing, 20 have
PACE programs, and 10 states cover what are known as “religious
non-medical institution and practitioner services.”5
Even if a state chooses to cover a service, they have discretion
over the amount of care that is covered. For instance, Maine covers
2-4 hours per week of personal care, while Montana and Nebraska
cover 40 hours per week. Even though all states cover home
health, variation is also evident: Alabama covers 104 home health
visits per year while Louisiana, Arkansas, and Georgia cover only
50 visits per year.
States may also vary in their administrative processes, and these
differences may affect spending. States, for example, vary with re-
spect to whether they require prior approval of services, develop-
ment of a plan of care, or significant cost-sharing requirements
that typically affect care utilization.
Relevance of Research for State Policymaking
As states seek to control or alter Medicaid long-term care
spending, compiling and organizing all of this information on pol-
icies will help policymakers better understand how their policy
choices may impact Medicaid spending. Relevant research ques-
tions include: Where are the biggest variations in spending? Are
these differences, in part, attributable to differences in policies?
Are there notable differences in covered populations that correlate
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with spending differences? If a state is generous in the popula-
tions it covers, is it also generous in the services it provides — and
how do these choices relate to expenditures? Are there some
states that cover more people but provide fewer services — and
how does spending differ from those states that cover fewer
people but more services?
As a first step in understanding how to interpret spending dif-
ferences and assess how spending may be controlled, policy mak-
ers need to know how they relate to differences in policy choices.
Many states have made sustained efforts, for example, to expand
home and community-based services with the expectation that
making these services available will reduce spending on nursing
homes, but the evidence for such a relationship has been mixed
and controversial. Not all community services are potential “sub-
stitutes” for nursing home care, and at least some states have ex-
panded community services without seeing a decline in long-term
care spending.
While there has been no shortage of studies of state long-term
care spending, this paper presents a distinctive approach to defin-
ing and measuring state long-term care policy and its influence on
state spending. Rather than looking to particular individual
long-term care policies such as service coverage, individual eligi-
bility, and rates as sources of variation in state long-term care
spending — this approach classifies states according to the partic-
ular combinations of long-term care policies they have adopted.
State long-term care policies do not operate in isolation, but inter-
act with each other to produce long-term care spending — states
with equally generous coverage of individuals and services, for
example, may spend very different amounts on long-term care if
they pay widely different rates for services. Differences in spend-
ing may be further amplified by differences in numbers of provid-
ers affected by state licensing requirements or certificate of need
procedures. Capturing these interactions between policies in par-
ticular states is likely to produce a better explanation of long-term
care spending than examining the effects of these policies in
isolation.
Summary of Findings
An initial finding of interest from the analysis is that states
tend to be more or less generous in all service areas rather than
being less generous in some. This is not surprising given that the
fiscal capacity of states may allow them different levels of re-
sources. But just because a state spends generously does not nec-
essarily mean that they pay the long-term care providers in their
state more generously.
This finding led us to examine more closely the interaction of
generosity of policies and generosity of payment. Interestingly,
the analysis showed that state payment policies are more influen-
tial in explaining state long-term care spending than state cover-
age policies, but that, not surprisingly, the interaction of the two
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together is likely to be more effective at explaining state spending
differences.
A further examination of one area of Medicaid long-term care
spending — waivers for persons with disabilities or the elderly —
showed that there is little relationship between generosity in the
use of Medicaid waivers and generosity in both coverage and
nursing homes fees.
Because differences in coverage of people and services do not
explain the variations in Medicaid spending, we hypothesize that
other things could be affecting these differences. Such factors
might include, for example, the ease of the application process, in-
centives for residents to apply for Medicaid-funded nursing care,
and differences in the ability of residents to “spend-down” to
qualify for Medicaid. Teasing out such administrative differences
would require more careful analysis of the data as well as qualita-
tive research.
Previous Research
Despite the importance of such information, little is known
about the reasons for differences in spending between states on
long-term care. In fact, there is very little literature on state dif-
ferences in long-term care spending and limited and dated re-
search on state policies. One analysis of long-term care
spending noted that states’ 2001 spending of their own funds
ranged from $61 per elderly person in Louisiana to $1,323 in
New York, and argued that “state coverage and reimbursement
policies are the most important factor” behind this variation.
But the assertion was not backed up by analyses involving
these policies.6
A more substantial, though still not large, literature exists on
total Medicaid or Medicare spending, and some of this research is
relevant to the proposed study. This literature may be grouped
into three categories:
1. Descriptive analyses of spending differences.
2. Statistical and other analyses of underlying reasons for
Medicare spending differences as they relate to geography.
3. Analysis of variation in price, utilization, quality, and pro-
vision of individual services.
A good example of descriptive analysis is a 1997 Urban Insti-
tute report by John Holahan and David Liska.7 Using 1994 data,
they “decomposed” Medicaid spending variation into differences
in coverage, differences in spending per covered person, and dif-
ferences in disproportionate share hospital (DSH) spending (pay-
ments by states to hospitals that serve a disproportionate share of
low-income patients).8 Among other things, they found that
Northeastern states generally covered larger shares of their low-
income populations than other states, but that relatively poor
states in the South with large low-income populations often
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covered larger shares of their populations. Donald Boyd’s chapter
in the Brookings Institution book, Medicaid and Devolution: A View
from the States, is another example. He presented a typology of
states based on breadth and intensity of coverage.9 However, nei-
ther of these projects isolated the role of long-term care and its in-
fluence on spending variation.
Other research has focused more attention on long-term care
policy and spending. The Urban Institute conducted studies of in-
dividual states in the mid to late 1990s, which classified state
long-term care cost containment policies into three broad catego-
ries.10 Research by Kitchener, Ng, Miller, Harrington, and others
has helped document state participation and spending on
long-term services — in particular, personal care services, home
health (since 1999 for those states that offer this service), and state
home and community-based waivers (since 2001). These research-
ers note that there are dramatic state-to-state variations in
participation and spending for each service.
Political scientists and economists have also conducted many
econometric analyses of variation in state welfare or Medicaid
spending. Typically these studies examined how spending varied
with political factors such as interparty competition and political
culture, and with economic variables such as income and poverty
and the federal reimbursement rate, often controlling for mea-
sures of health status and health care prices.11
These econometric studies provide insights into underlying
reasons for state policy choices — they help to explain the extent
to which richer states, or states with a liberal political culture, may
be willing to support Medicaid long-term care spending. How-
ever, most provide little understanding of the implications of spe-
cific policies and are of little use to policymakers. One important
exception that focused on policies and specifically on long-term
care (without providing information on specific states) examined
state variation in expenditures on Medicaid community-based
programs.12 Also, these studies rarely provide information on
why specific states vary, information that state policymakers need
to put their own spending into context.13
While frequently sophisticated, these studies neglect many as-
pects of state long-term care policy that most would agree are po-
tentially important influences on spending, but which have proven
difficult to measure. Administrative policies and processes are not
as well documented as policies on eligibility and services, but could
greatly influence utilization and expenditures. Such policies in-
clude, for example, how many “available slots” a state has for
waiver participants, the financial and medical eligibility criteria for
waivers, and caps on spending. It can also include administrative
procedures such as the use of prior authorization, extent of docu-
mentation for eligibility, developing plans of care, or requiring
cost-sharing.
Perhaps more importantly, the existing literature on long-term
care policy spending is frequently focused on particular categories
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of service rather than on the whole complex of state long-term
care policies. Students of long-term care policy tend to specialize
in particular means of service delivery, so much scholarly litera-
ture on long-term care spending has been “stovepiped” or fo-
cused on nursing homes or various forms of home and
community-based care, with little attention to how disparate poli-
cies interact to drive long-term care spending. Reducing growth in
nursing home spending has been a perennial issue for policy mak-
ers and scholars alike, so much long-term care literature takes the
form of experimental comparisons of the effects of various forms
of home- or community-based programs on nursing home or total
long-term care spending. As in other areas of human service pol-
icy, there has been little direct attention to the question of whether
states that have devoted considerable resources to developing
home- and community-based services have in fact reduced spend-
ing on institutional care.14
Analytical Approach
This paper advances this argument in three steps. First, we ex-
amine previous research on long-term care spending and note the
focus on particular policies, rather than their interaction, in previ-
ous attempts to explain long-term care spending. Second, we look
at three frequently studied major classes of state long-term care
policy — service and coverage generosity in non-long-term care
Medicaid programs, reliance on waivers to expand home and
community- based services in a variety of ways, and rates for
nursing home services — and examine their individual impact on
long-term care spending. Finally, we examine one means of mea-
suring policy interaction — a consolidated index of program gen-
erosity that combines a variety of long-term care policies — and
find that this consolidated measure explains more of the differ-
ence in state long-term care spending than separate policies con-
sidered in isolation. While hardly definitive, these findings
suggest that an integrated approach to understanding and mea-
suring state long-term care policies is likely to prove effective in
explaining state long-term care spending. Our findings are signifi-
cant — even at this simple level, the interactive generosity index
explains more of the variation in long-term care spending than the
“additive” effects of separate state policy variables.
Defining and Measuring Long-Term Care Policy
There is no standard definition of state long-term care policy,
any clear way to measure important dimensions of long-term care
policy, nor any clear theoretical statement of how policy differ-
ences are expected to influence differences in spending. Most stu-
dents of long-term care policy rely on measures of program
generosity — states that cover more people for more services and
pay higher rates for individual services are, not unreasonably, ex-
pected to spend more on long-term care than those that cover
fewer people and services and pay lower fees. Data on Medicaid
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service coverage, numbers of long-term care recipients, service
spending and rates for at least some services are readily available
and have attracted considerable attention as explanatory variables
in studies of long-term care spending.
Medicaid Waivers
Other policy variables are more difficult to interpret unambig-
uously. One such variable is the size of state participation in vari-
ous home- and community-based waiver programs (HCBS).
HCBS waivers have been major elements in state Medicaid policy
across a number of long-term care service categories, including
services to the mentally retarded and mentally ill as well as the el-
derly. In general, these waivers allow states to claim Medicaid re-
imbursement for services outside institutional settings, some of
which may be covered under a state’s conventional Medicaid pro-
gram and some of which are not. Unlike conventional Medicaid,
where coverage of a service makes it available to all Medicaid cli-
ents, waivers allow services to be limited to a specified population
and limited in duration.
The services and clients covered by a particular waiver are ne-
gotiated between state agencies and the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) and can vary widely both between states
and between individual waivers within a given states. Waivers
can be granted, for example, to provide services in the community
to the small number of relatively disabled individuals who might
otherwise reside in a nursing home or other institution, which
might be expected to reduce nursing home spending. Such waiv-
ers will generate high levels of spending for each enrollee, though
hopefully less than the cost of keeping enrollees in nursing homes.
Alternatively, waivers can be used to expand community services
to a larger number of less disabled individuals. Services for each
individual are relatively inexpensive, so large numbers of clients
can be provided services at far less than the cost of nursing home
care.
While information is readily available for enrollment and ex-
penditures for different varieties of waivers, it’s far from clear that
larger waivers should be unambiguously associated with in-
creased long-term care spending. More detailed examination of
waiver provisions in individual states would be required to define
a state’s waiver policy goals and how programs funded through
waivers are expected to affect state long-term care spending.
Supply of Long-Term Care Providers
A second set of long-term care policies that have been difficult
to measure precisely or connect to spending in a convincing way
relates to state management of the supply of long-term care pro-
viders through the certificate of need process, provider licensing,
or Medicaid coverage of new varieties of providers. The certificate
of need process for licensing new nursing home beds was histori-
cally used by many states as a means of limiting spending by
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restricting the supply of nursing home beds, but evidence sug-
gests that certificate of need or other attempts to limit the supply
of beds had no effect on long-term care expenditures.15 There also
have been anecdotal reports that the increased availability of as-
sisted living and other residential care arrangements have re-
duced nursing home occupancy, but there has been little system-
atic attention as yet to the effects of these alternative
arrangements on nursing home spending. Medicaid has fre-
quently covered various residential services arrangement as an al-
ternative to institutional care for the mentally ill or mentally
retarded, but few states as yet cover residential services for the el-
derly or other potential nursing home clients. It is unclear
whether increasing residential spending could be expected to re-
duce Medicaid spending on nursing homes or long-term care in
total. The effects of other forms of home- and community-based
spending on nursing home spending has been controversial, with
some observers arguing that the increased availability of commu-
nity services brings community clients “out of the woodwork”
without drawing many clients out of nursing homes.16
Long-Term Care Administrative Policies
Finally, there has been little systematic attention to differences
between states in the way long-term care policy has been man-
aged. Administrative policies and processes are not as well docu-
mented as policies on eligibility and services, but could greatly
influence utilization and expenditures. Such policies include, for
example, how many available slots a state has for waiver partici-
pants, the financial and medical eligibility criteria for waivers, and
caps on spending. It can also include administrative procedures
such as the use of prior authorization, extent of documentation for
eligibility, developing plans of care, or requiring cost-sharing.
The measures of long-term care policy examined in this paper
rely on readily available measures of population and service cov-
erage, waiver populations and spending, and service payment
rates, both individually and in combination to test for the pres-
ence of interactions among sets of state policies.
Analysis
Population and Service Generosity
Perhaps the most straightforward measure of state long-term
care policy is the generosity of its coverage of both populations and
services. Other things being equal, states that cover a large propor-
tion of the population for particular long-term care services with
few or no limitations on service availability should spend more on
long-term care than states which limit enrollment or services.
To classify states according to differences in populations cov-
ered and service generosity, eligibility and service policies for
each state in 2004 were coded for the major categories of
long-term care services listed in Table 1. Codes for each state were
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assigned based on data contained in the Medicaid
Benefits database maintained by the Kaiser Fam-
ily Foundation.15 Codes were assigned so that
generosity of coverage and services were equally
weighted.16
Once generosity scores were coded for each
state, factor analysis was used to test for underly-
ing dimensions of “coverage and service generos-
ity,”17 or whether states with generous population
and service standards in one service area tended
to have generous standards in all service areas.
The results of this analysis, presented in
Table 2, indicate that coverage and ser-
vice generosity is correlated across all
these service areas.18 The figures in the ta-
ble are factor “loadings” or measures of
the extent to which individual variables
are related to the underlying dimension,
or “factor” identified by the analysis. All
eight variables are highly correlated with
the underlying factor, suggesting that
states tend to be more or less generous in
all service areas rather than being
generous in some services and less so in
others.
Based on this analysis, individual states can also be assigned
factor scores, or measures of their ranking on the coverage and
service generosity factor. States with high scores have more gener-
ous policies, those with lower are less generous. These scores are
listed in Table 3. While there are notable exceptions, these scores
suggest that larger, wealthier states in the Northeast and Midwest
tend to have more generous coverage and eligibility policies than
smaller, poorer states in the South and the West. There are excep-
tions to both these patterns — some Northeastern and Midwest-
ern states such as New Jersey and Ohio are among the least
generous states as measured by this standard. Conversely, a num-
ber of smaller, poorer states — North Dakota, Nebraska, West Vir-
ginia, and Louisiana, for example — have more generous
coverage and service policies than some larger, wealthier states.
Poorer states have higher Medicaid “match rates” than wealthier
ones — the federal government pays a larger share of Medicaid
spending — and this difference may have made it possible for
these poorer states to be more expansive in the population and
services they cover.
Differences in coverage of people and long-term care services,
however, do not completely explain differences in spending on
long-term care. As measured in this fashion, service and coverage
generosity are only moderately correlated (.44) with overall per
capita long-term care spending, suggesting that states with more
generous coverage do spend more than those with less generous
Home Health 0.78
Hospice 0.64
Personal Care 0.64
Private Duty Nurse 0.57
Intermediate Care Facility, Mental Health 0.66
Inpatient Psychiatric Care 0.83
Intermediate Care, Mental Retardation 0.90
Nursing Home 0.85
Source: Rockefeller Institute analysis.
Table 2. Factor Loadings for Individual Services on
Coverage and Service Generosity Factor
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Home Health
Hospice
Personal Care
Private Duty Nurse
Intermediate Care Facility, Mental Health
Inpatient Psychiatric Care
Intermediate Care, Mental Retardation
Nursing Home
Table 1. Long-Term Care Services Used to Classify
State Population and Service Generosity
coverage, but not dramatically so. A vari-
ety of other state policies alter the rela-
tionship between generosity of coverage
and generosity of spending.
One set of such state policies has to do
with participation rates, or the proportion
of eligible residents who are actually en-
rolled in Medicaid. While states may have
very generous income and other limits on
who can enroll in Medicaid, it may be
more or less difficult for eligible residents
in different states to actually enroll in
Medicaid.19 State application processes
and practices, for example, may be more
or less “user friendly” for recipients and
applicants and result in differing enroll-
ment rates between states with similar el-
igibility levels. States that have liberal
coverage policies may offset some of the
potential effects of these policies on
spending by making coverage more diffi-
cult to secure. Concern with false positive
error rates or “runaway” spending on
such expensive services as nursing home
care or residential care for the mentally or
psychiatrically disabled may lead states
to adopt administrative practices that
make it more difficult for eligibles to en-
roll.20
Other state policies may offset some
of these disincentives to enroll in
Medicaid. In states where Medicaid pay-
ment levels for nursing homes and other
long-term care services are relatively gen-
erous and are seen to support a high
quality of care, elderly residents may
have more incentive to apply for
Medicaid than residents of states where
Medicaid payments are lower and the
quality of care in facilities that accept
Medicaid is seen as less desirable. De-
bates over long-term care policy making
are replete with anecdotes of “spend -
down” by wealthy individuals in New
York and other generous states who are
able to make use of various trusts and
other legal maneuvers to safeguard their
assets and become Medicaid eligible.
While a variety of studies suggest that
such tactics are utilized far less than
State
Factor Scores, Coverage,
and Service Generosity
North Dakota 1.60
New York 1.43
Minnesota 1.41
Nebraska 1.41
Arizona 1.37
Massachusetts 1.36
Wisconsin 1.31
Maine 1.24
Maryland 0.99
Oregon 0.90
West Virginia 0.88
California 0.84
Michigan 0.83
Pennsylvania 0.77
Rhode Island 0.68
New Hampshire 0.68
Montana 0.62
Washington 0.57
Louisiana 0.52
North Carolina 0.51
Connecticut 0.48
Kansas 0.46
Illinois 0.39
Utah 0.34
Vermont 0.27
Kentucky 0.22
Hawaii 0.14
Tennessee 0.00
Florida -0.15
Arkansas -0.21
New Jersey -0.55
Virginia -0.57
Texas -0.63
Iowa -0.65
Missouri -0.75
Delaware -0.99
South Dakota -1.02
Alaska -1.12
Nevada -1.12
New Mexico -1.12
Colorado -1.13
Indiana -1.13
Ohio -1.13
South Carolina -1.23
Idaho -1.27
Georgia -1.39
Alabama -1.40
Oklahoma -1.53
Mississippi -1.54
Wyoming -1.59
Source: Rockefeller Institute analysis.
Table 3. State Factor Scores on Coverage and Service Generosity
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anecdotes would suggest,21 there may
well be significant differences between
states in spend-down.
While there is little doubt that state
coverage of people and services has a sig-
nificant influence on state spending on
long-term care, there are other state poli-
cies that may mitigate this impact. Sys-
tematic evidence on these policies and
their effects is, unfortunately, difficult to
obtain. State participation rates and ad-
ministrative practices governing eligibil-
ity can only be determined by on-site
investigation in individual states, and cal-
culating spend-down rates in different
states would require detailed analyses of
Medicaid eligibility records in those
states.
Payment Rates
A second state policy that might be
expected to influence long-term care
spending is the rates states pay for par-
ticular services. Other things being
equal, states that pay more for services
will have higher long-term care expendi-
tures than those that pay less. It is diffi-
cult, however, to collect reliable data on
the rates states pay for a wide range of
long-term care services. States pay for
services using different methodologies
and service units and may change their
methodologies over time. We rely here
on average nursing home per diem pay-
ments collected by the Kaiser Commis-
sion for 2002, listed in Table 4. While we
only have data on one long-term care
service, nursing homes account for the
bulk of long-term care spending in most
states, making it unlikely that rate data
for more services would appreciably al-
ter this ranking.
These data indicate an enormous dis-
parity in payment rates across states.
New York, which paid the highest rates
in this survey, had daily rates better than
twice that of Louisiana, which was the
lowest paying state. The difference in the
financial burden of these different rates
was exacerbated by the fact that the
State
Average Nursing Home
Payments Per Day, 2002
New York $172
Connecticut $165
Delaware $160
Maryland $151
Ohio $144
New Jersey $142
Massachusetts $141
Pennsylvania $138
Florida $134
Rhode Island $134
Idaho $132
Maine $132
Minnesota $130
West Virginia $130
Washington $129
Vermont $128
Alabama $127
New Hampshire $127
North Dakota $127
North Carolina $126
Colorado $123
Nevada $122
Michigan $119
Wyoming $117
Arizona $114
California $114
Virginia $113
Oregon $111
Wisconsin $110
Kentucky $108
Mississippi $106
Indiana $103
New Mexico $103
South Carolina $103
Utah $103
Montana $102
Nebraska $100
Missouri $97
Texas $96
Iowa $95
Kansas $95
Arkansas $94
Oklahoma $94
Tennessee $92
Georgia $91
Illinois $90
South Dakota $87
Louisiana $82
Source: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2002.
Table 4. Average Nursing Home Payments Per Day by State, 2002
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federal government paid almost 75 percent of Louisiana’s rate, but
only slightly more than half that for New York. Taking this differ-
ence in federal matching rate into account, a nursing home day
costs Louisiana about $22 but costs New York $81, or almost four
times as much. Most of the states that pay high daily nursing
home rates are relatively wealthy states in the Northeast and the
Midwest that have federal matching rates similar to New York,
while the bulk of the states that pay lower fees are poorer states in
the Southeast and the West that have matching rates closer to
Louisiana’s.
A comparison between these data and those in Table 3 suggest
there isn’t much relationship between generosity of coverage and
generosity of payment. Of the states with the most generous cov-
erage as listed in Table 3, only three — New York, Massachusetts,
and Maryland — are also among the most generous payers. Sev-
eral states with generous coverage policies, such as North Dakota
and Nebraska, do not pay particularly generous rates; while other
states with less generous coverall policies, such as Ohio and New
Jersey, pay higher nursing home fees. Overall, nursing home rates
are only slightly correlated with coverage generosity (.27), indicat-
ing that states which pay high rates don’t necessarily have more
generous coverage policies. This result is in line with earlier find-
ings of a trade-off between coverage and payment policy in other
areas of Medicaid — states with more generous coverage policies
tend to pay lower rates than states with less generous coverage.
Higher nursing home rates are more closely correlated with total
long-term care spending than is coverage generosity (.59 as com-
pared to .47). In a regression equation with total long-term care
spending as the dependent variable, rates and coverage generos-
ity together explain just over 40 percent of the variation in total
spending, which is roughly comparable with earlier results.
These findings suggest that state payment policies are more
influential in explaining state long-term care spending than state
coverage policies, but that the interaction of the two policies to-
gether is likely to be more effective in explaining state spending
than the two policies individually. States that are generous in both
coverage and payment are likely to be the highest spending states,
particularly since many states seem to be trading off eligibility
generosity and high nursing home payments.
Home- and Community-Based Waivers
A third set of state long-term care policies with the potential to
affect long-term care spending are home- and community-based
waivers. When first established, Medicaid only covered services
provided in institutions — nursing homes and state mental retar-
dation facilities.22 The waiver program23 was established in 1981
in response to pressures for “deinstitutionalization” in a variety of
service areas, and has been the major means by which states have
developed community programs in mental health, mental retarda-
tion, and programs for the elderly. The terms of individual
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waivers are negotiated between states and the federal CMS and
can differ widely between states and between the terms of indi-
vidual waivers in a particular state. States can develop waivers
aimed at particular geographic areas; particular populations, such
as the elderly, mentally retarded, or children; particular condi-
tions, such as traumatic brain injury; or particular services, some
of which may be covered under a state’s standard Medicaid pro-
gram and others that may not. Unlike the standard Medicaid pro-
gram, states can limit covered services to waiver participants and
set a limit on the number of program participants. Waiver pro-
grams have expanded dramatically since their inception in the
early 1980s — in 2003, total spending under these waivers
amounted to almost $19 billion and enrollment was almost 1 mil-
lion individuals.24
As a result of flexibility in coverage and program content,
states vary widely in the extent to which they have made use of
these waivers and the policy goals which they have chosen to pur-
sue via these waivers.25 Some states have attempted to use waiv-
ers as a means of reducing institutional spending by focusing
services on the small numbers of relatively expensive clients who
would otherwise be required to be cared for in an institutional set-
ting. Others have expanded a range of less expensive services to a
larger number of less disabled clients either to allow independent
functioning for clients or to provide a supplement for unpaid care
by family members. Several have pursued these differing goals
simultaneously or at different points in time.
This diversity of program goals, size, and scale make it ex-
tremely difficult to connect waiver activity and overall long-term
care spending in any simple way. Much waiver activity has been
undertaken with the expectation that increased community
spending will produce larger reductions in institutional spending,
but evidence in support of this expectation has been controversial.
Community spending advocates have argued that many individu-
als can clearly be provided services in the community at lower
cost than in institutions; detractors have argued that the availabil-
ity of community services has led to increased demand from less
disabled individuals already resident in the community, with rela-
tively little movement of clients out of nursing homes. Institu-
tional care providers are frequently major employers and
purchasers in local communities, making it politically difficult to
realize whatever savings are available from closing or downsizing
these providers.
The data in Table 5 suggest some of the difficulties in inter-
preting the aggregate relationship between waiver activity and
long-term care spending. The data represent the percent of the
state population enrolled in some form of home- and community-
based waiver, presented for the major types of waivers and
ranked by total enrollment
These data suggest several complications. There is no relation-
ship between participation in one type of waiver and another, so
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State
Mental Retardation
and Developmentally
Disabled
Aged and Aged
and Disabled
Physically
Disabled All Other Waivers Total, All Waivers
Oregon 2.22 8.94 0.00 0.03 11.18
Minnesota 3.03 2.86 1.86 0.18 7.93
Kansas 2.32 2.23 1.60 0.66 6.81
Washington 1.42 4.92 0.00 0.00 6.34
Wisconsin 2.24 3.69 0.00 0.06 5.98
Wyoming 3.06 2.70 0.00 0.14 5.90
Vermont 3.07 2.55 0.00 0.28 5.90
Nebraska 3.02 2.83 0.00 0.01 5.85
Colorado 1.64 3.44 0.00 0.71 5.78
Idaho 1.03 4.70 0.00 0.01 5.74
Iowa 2.94 2.40 0.10 0.19 5.62
Missouri 1.36 4.08 0.09 0.01 5.55
Oklahoma 1.22 4.11 0.00 0.00 5.33
Alaska 1.44 2.07 1.33 0.31 5.15
Connecticut 1.70 2.98 0.14 0.06 4.88
South Carolina 1.12 3.28 0.01 0.39 4.81
Illinois 0.77 2.16 1.54 0.29 4.76
West Virginia 1.64 3.11 0.00 0.00 4.75
Rhode Island 2.26 2.36 0.08 0.00 4.69
Mississippi 0.71 3.57 0.22 0.11 4.61
North Dakota 3.65 0.85 0.00 0.05 4.54
New Hampshire 2.35 2.02 0.00 0.06 4.43
Kentucky 0.51 3.80 0.01 0.02 4.35
South Dakota 2.68 1.53 0.10 0.00 4.31
Arkansas 0.95 2.74 0.43 0.00 4.12
New York 2.73 1.11 0.00 0.16 4.00
Ohio 1.06 2.22 0.57 0.00 3.84
Montana 1.94 1.56 0.00 0.00 3.49
Pennsylvania 1.99 1.04 0.21 0.01 3.25
Maine 1.83 1.13 0.25 0.00 3.21
Florida 1.47 1.27 0.00 0.41 3.15
Delaware 0.81 1.58 0.00 0.69 3.08
New Mexico 1.66 1.20 0.00 0.10 2.96
Alabama 1.09 1.74 0.10 0.00 2.93
Hawaii 1.37 1.40 0.00 0.10 2.86
Georgia 0.97 1.76 0.00 0.09 2.82
Massachusetts 1.82 0.93 0.00 0.00 2.76
Texas 0.57 1.84 0.00 0.05 2.46
Virginia 0.78 1.37 0.05 0.04 2.23
Maryland 1.40 0.50 0.07 0.15 2.12
Utah 1.61 0.36 0.05 0.09 2.10
North Carolina 0.68 1.26 0.00 0.08 2.02
California 1.44 0.40 0.02 0.08 1.95
Indiana 1.19 0.60 0.00 0.05 1.84
New Jersey 0.57 1.00 0.03 0.13 1.72
Michigan 0.77 0.91 0.00 0.04 1.72
Louisiana 0.89 0.49 0.05 0.06 1.49
Nevada 0.48 0.78 0.22 0.00 1.48
District of Columbia 0.55 0.49 0.00 0.01 1.05
Tennessee 0.76 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.85
Source: Rockefeller Institute analysis of Kaiser Family Foundation data (latest data available at
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=241&cat=4).
Table 5. Medicaid 1915(c) Home- and Community-Based Service Waiver Participants,
by Type of Waiver, 2003 Waiver Population Per 1,000 People
Health Policy Medicaid Policy and Long-Term Care Spending: An Interactive View
Rockefeller Institute Page 14 www.rockinst.org
that there is no underlying dimension or factor that could be used
to simplify the analysis. Second, there is no simple relationship
between participation in different types of waivers and overall
long-term care spending. The only significant statistical relation-
ship between waiver participation and long-term care spending is
for waiver activity for the mentally retarded and developmentally
disabled, which is strongly and positively related to overall
spending. At least in some states, the large institutions that once
were the sole source of services for this population have been
largely replaced by a wide range of residential and nonresidential
community programs,26 so the relationship between waiver activ-
ity and spending may be stronger in this area than in other pro-
gram areas, such as care for the disabled elderly, where
institutional care in nursing homes is still a major source of ser-
vices. Third, it should be remembered that services covered under
many waivers may also be covered under other service categories
in a state’s Medicaid program. Personal care services that provide
the disabled elderly with help with shopping, cooking, and other
activities of daily living, for example, may be covered by waivers
in one state and by the standard Medicaid program in another. Fi-
nally, because of these complex ties between standard programs
and waiver programs, there is little relationship between “gener-
osity” in the use of waivers and generosity in both coverage and
nursing home fees. States such as Oregon, Kansas, and Nebraska,
for example, which are among the heaviest users of waivers, pay
relatively low nursing home rates, while others, such as Minne-
sota and Connecticut, are both substantial users of waivers and
relatively generous payers.
Discussion
The analysis presented in this paper has suggested some of the
difficulties with simplistic approaches to understanding the rela-
tionship between state Medicaid long-term care policy and
Medicaid long-term care spending. Simple measurements of impor-
tant state management and administrative practices are not avail-
able. Medicaid service categories overlap, so that services covered
by waivers in some states are covered by standard Medicaid pro-
grams in others. Finally, Medicaid policies interact in ways that are
difficult to identify with conventional methods. At least some waiv-
ers, for example, are intended to reduce spending on expensive in-
stitutional care, but there has been little attempt to test for these
interactions in most models of Medicaid spending.
The difficulties suggest the need for two different directions in
further studies of Medicaid long-term care policy. One is for
closer, more qualitative, attention to individual states or compara-
tive studies of groups of states. Because the policy substance of
home- and community-based waivers is so diverse, for example, it
is likely to prove difficult to identify the effects of these programs
on Medicaid spending without attention to the particular policies
pursued in individual states or groups of states. A second
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improvement would be to develop measures that recognize the
potential interactions between Medicaid policies. The first of these
directions is beyond the scope of this paper, but we can propose a
direction for the second.
A Way Forward: Interactive Approaches
to Measuring Medicaid Policy
One of the major complications in measuring the effects of
Medicaid long-term care policies on Medicaid long-term care
spending is that individual state policies governing eligibility,
rates, or services do not exist in a policy vacuum, but interact with
each other in ways that are frequently not obvious, but exert a
considerable influence on spending nonetheless. A given change
in a nursing home rate, for example, can vary widely in its impact
on total spending, depending on the number of clients covered by
the change and the number of nursing home beds for which it can
be paid. Expanding a home- and community-based waiver pro-
gram might be expected either to reduce nursing home and total
long-term care spending or to increase total spending depending
on the clientele and the services covered by the waiver. Tradi-
tional approaches to measuring the effects of state policies on
spending typically do not test for these interactions.
One method for addressing this problem is to develop measures
of long-term care policy that allow state policy choices to interact
with each other. Rather than examining the effects of individual poli-
cies in isolation, students of state long-term care policy may find it
more fruitful to develop measures of combinations of state long-term
care policies that allow for the possibility that generosity in one pol-
icy area can be offset by more conservative policies in other areas or
to recognize the interactive effect of multiple liberal policies on state
long-term care spending. Such methods as factor analysis, which test
for underlying dimensions of policy generosity across a variety of
policy areas and allow states to be characterized by their standing on
these underlying dimensions, may be more productive than the labo-
rious process of testing for interactions between sets of individual
variables in a conventional regression approach.
An index of Medicaid program generosity de-
veloped by Park illustrates this approach.27 Park’s
index uses factor analysis based on the variables
in Table 6, to identify a single generosity dimen-
sion that combines measures of client eligibility,
nursing home bed capacity, waiver scale, and
nursing home rates.28 States with generous eligi-
bility policies, lots of nursing home beds and
waiver slots, and generous per diem payments
will rank high on this index compared to states
whose programs are less generous in particular
areas.
Policy generosity indices for individual states
are displayed in Table 7. Scores have been
Nursing Home Payment Per Diem
Nursing Home Bed Ratio per 1,000 Elderly Aged 65 and Over
Medicaid Payments to Elderly Nursing Home Residents
Aged 65 Years and Over
Ratio of Medicaid Payments to Nursing Homes
to Private Payments
1915 ©) HCBS Medicaid Waiver Expenditure Per
Elderly Medicaid Enrollee
Medicaid Payments for Home Health Per Elderly Medicaid Enrollee
Percentage of Nursing Home Residents to the
Elderly Population Aged 65 Years and Older
Percentage of the Aged Medicaid Enrollees to the
Elderly Population Aged 65 Years and Older
Table 6. Variables Used in Factor Analysis
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standardized to a range of 0 to 100. These
results suggest a pattern noted by other
students of long-term care policy — one
extremely generous state (New York), a
relatively small number of relatively gen-
erous states — only 11 states have scores
above 50 — and a larger number of less
generous states. It should be noted that the
states identified in the last section as having
particularly large home- and community-
based waiver programs show significant
disparities in their overall generosity
scores. Wisconsin and Minnesota have both
large waiver programs and generous poli-
cies overall, while states such as Washing-
ton, Oregon, and Kansas have large waiver
programs, but less generous policies over-
all. This pattern suggests that Washington,
Oregon, and Kansas may have managed
their waiver programs with the express in-
tent of using community- based programs
as a means of holding down nursing home
spending, while Wisconsin and Minnesota
may have been more interested in expand-
ing services for elderly residents who are at
less risk for institutionalization.
This index performs considerably better
in explaining state long-term care spending
than our earlier efforts. By itself, this index
“explains” almost two-thirds of variation in
total long-term care spending across states,
which is a considerable improvement over
our earlier results. This result suggests there
may be substantial interactions between
long-term care policies, but these interactions
may not be obvious or the same in all states.
Conclusions
This analysis suggests that investiga-
tions of the effects of state long-term care
policy on long-term care spending should
proceed along two separate tracks. One is
the use of consolidated or interactive mea-
sures of state policies, rather than adding
individual policy variables to regression
equations predicting spending one variable
at a time. Policies may interact with each
other with unexpected effects on spending,
and research designs need to allow for this
possibility.
State Generosity Index
New York 99.55%
Connecticut 82.61%
Minnesota 75.87%
Massachusetts 67.77%
Louisiana 63.94%
District of Columbia 62.88%
Rhode Island 58.99%
Wisconsin 58.26%
North Dakota 53.87%
New Hampshire 53.46%
Maine 51.19%
Wyoming 48.91%
Alaska 48.64%
Vermont 46.69%
Kansas 46.52%
Iowa 45.62%
Indiana 45.17%
Ohio 44.60%
Arkansas 44.56%
Texas 44.49%
Nebraska 44.46%
Delaware 44.01%
New Jersey 43.52%
Illinois 42.89%
South Dakota 42.36%
Missouri 41.22%
Oklahoma 40.36%
Mississippi 39.98%
Montana 39.45%
North Carolina 39.01%
Georgia 38.37%
Tennessee 37.26%
Colorado 35.18%
Pennsylvania 35.14%
Maryland 34.97%
Michigan 34.66%
Washington 34.03%
Kentucky 33.26%
New Mexico 30.60%
South Carolina 30.56%
Idaho 28.09%
West Virginia 28.01%
Utah 27.00%
Alabama 26.11%
Oregon 26.03%
California 24.94%
Virginia 19.56%
Hawaii 9.55%
Florida 4.28%
Nevada 0.00%
Source: Rockefeller Institute analysis.
Table 7. Long-Term Care Policy Generosity Index by State, 2004
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The second direction for analysis of long-term care policy
would be to focus on more qualitative examinations of individual
states or groups of states. Home- and community-based waivers,
for example, can be used to pursue a variety of policy goals that
can’t be easily identified from aggregate enrollment and expendi-
ture statistics, and detailed on-site investigation of state priorities
and practices may be required for satisfactory definition of state
policies. In similar fashion, state administrative policies and prac-
tices such as outreach and referral may influence state spending,
but can’t be readily determined from aggregate data. Such prac-
tices can be meaningfully compared using qualitative data in a
comparative case study framework and combined with other data
in a variety of other analyses.29
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